Secondly, the theory fails to take into account that because the president acts as a policy leader for his political party, he too has a stake in bills that are on the floor of Congress. As a result he can be forced to make concessions just like any individual legislator. On trade policy, this can mean the president is susceptible to logrolling. This turns the logic behind the RTAA and similar measures upside down. Rather than viewing the executive as a cure-all for liberalizing trade, perhaps future legislation should turn the ability to negotiate free trade agreements over to a semi-independent figurehead, much like the position currently occupied by Alan Greenspan. This figurehead could have a term long enough to not tie him to any specific president and thus be relatively immune from congressional politics. This new office would realize Oatley's logic on a whole new level, because far from having a national constituency, the independent office would have no direct constituency to pressure him away from doing what's best for the country. Until these structural and political reforms are adopted, the RTAA and legislation like it will fail to produce a liberalized trade policy that maximizes societal welfare.
Be Sure to Continue to Page 7 of "The Executive's Local Constituencies".